By Derek Royal 

Some birds just shouldn’t flock together and when the metal and feather varieties collide, the results can be fatal. Aviator looks at the bird problem faced by airports worldwide.

On January 15th 2009 US Airways’ first officer Jeffrey Skiles reported for duty at New York’s La Guardia Airport ready to experience his first hands-on flight in an A320 Airbus. As Skiles settled into the right-hand seat alongside former fighter pilot and 29-year airline veteran, Captain Chesley Sullenberger, he had no idea that in a matter of minutes he would experience one of the most apocalyptic moments in aviation history.   

Skiles was at the controls of the flight when it took off to the northeast from Runway 4 at 3:25 p.m, bound for Charlotte, North Carolina. Passing through 3,200 feet on the initial climb to 15,000 feet, the F/O noticed a formation of birds approaching the aircraft. Two minutes later feathers and metal collided, turning the A320’s windscreen into a deathly combination of red and dark brown. As both engines ingested birds, causing an immediate loss of thrust, Captain Sullenberger took the controls, while Skiles began ploughing through the three-page emergency procedures checklist in an attempt to restart the engines.

Six long minutes after departure, and realising he couldn’t return to La Guardia or land the A320 at a safe alternate location, Sullenberger skilfully ditched the airliner into New York’s Hudson River. All 155 people on board the aircraft were rescued and Sullenberger and his crew became instant heroes.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Board Member Kitty Higgins described the landing as, “the most successful ditching in aviation history". "These people (the crew) knew what they were supposed to do and they did it and, as a result, nobody lost their life."

The A320 was deemed a write-off by salvage contractor Weeks Marine, but another contractor suggested that if due care had been taken during the recovery, the aircraft could have been repaired for US$20 million (less than a third of the cost of a new aircraft).

The NTSB confirmed that bird remains had been found in both engines and through DNA testing the bird debris was later identified as Canada Geese. The typical weight of these birds was well above the limits the engines were designed to withstand on impact.

In June and July 2009, the United States Department of Agriculture Wildlife Services and the city’s Parks and Recreation Department and Environmental Protection Departments sent workers to 17 locations across New York, capturing and gassing more than 1,200 Canada Geese. The Agriculture Department coated 1,739 goose eggs with corn oil, which prevents goslings from developing by depriving them of air.

It is now believed that more than 50,000 birdstrikes occur in civil aviation every year. In Australia, between 2002 and 2006 the number of birdstrikes reported annually to the ATSB (Aviation Transport Safety Bureau) increased from approximately 750 to 1,200. In total, there were 5,103 reported birdstrikes between 2002 and 2006. Because of these statistics aerodrome operators are being warned that they need to look closely at the steps they are taking to minimise the risk of birdstrikes in Australia. Global data shows that between 1988 and 2005 aircraft collisions with birds and other wildlife resulted in 195 fatalities.

The effect of birdstrikes on aircraft operations is measured mainly in monetary terms. As the US Airways crash in New York clearly demonstrates, the cost of a birdstrike in repairs and lost operating time to a major airline can run into the millions of dollars if a bird strikes a jet engine. In 1995 Qantas estimated a birdstrike involving an Airbus A300 at Gold Coast Airport cost the company $8 million. Two years later a Qantas aircraft ingested an Ibis at 2,500 feet, resulting in a cost of $6 million; while two birdstrikes in late 2006 cost the company more than $305,000. Both strikes involved engine ingestion.

Qantas also estimated that the combined cost of aircraft inspections, repairs, cleaning and delays related to birdstrike events was $2.3 million in 2006. This included delays, crew alterations, rescheduling flights and accommodation and injuries.

The cost and frequency of birdstrikes has also prompted a warning that legal action could be taken against people or organisations that have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent them. Insurers estimate birdstrikes cost civil aviation US$1.2 billion per year.

In 1995, charges of involuntary manslaughter were brought against airport authorities at Le Bourget Airport in Paris after a Dassault Falcon business jet crashed on takeoff following a birdstrike. The bird destroyed the left engine and all 10 people (and a dog) on board died in the crash. Airport staff were found to have failed to perform routine bird-scaring before the accident.

In 1996 a Boeing 737 engine ingested gulls on takeoff at Pula Airport, Croatia. The pilot aborted takeoff without injury or further damage to the aircraft. But airline insurers claimed reimbursement from the airport for the damage compensation paid to the airline.

Such incidents demonstrate that aerodromes must invest in effective bird risk management programs or suffer the consequences. As a result of ICAO standards and local regulations, airports now have a legal responsibility to protect aircraft from risk. 

Birdstrike rates worldwide and in Australia are climbing, as faster and quieter turbo-jet aircraft dominate the air, meaning airports must take a high level of responsibility for managing the risk of bird strike.
Biologist Phil Shaw says that over 90% of bird strikes happen at or near aerodromes. “That’s because most birds tend to fly fairly close to the ground – where aircraft takeoff and land,” he says. “Aerodrome operators should put into place a bird management strategy, ideally guided by biologists experienced in assessing bird strike risk. This (birdstrike) is one of the most manageable risks that confront airport operators, yet Australia still has a long way to go.”

Despite Shaw’s concerns, Gold Coast Airport responded immediately to the 1995 birdstrike involving the Qantas A300. The bird ingested was an Australian White Ibis, a heavy bird known to cause significant damage. Gold Coast Airport enlisted the support of local councils and Nationals Parks and Wildlife Services across two states, local green groups, wildlife sanctuaries and others to develop a management program aimed specifically at the Ibis.

“They trained safety staff in better dispersal and removal techniques, filled depressions and reshaped creeks and drains,” Shaw says. “A trial was conducted into grass lengths and long grass (mown at 300mm) was found to greatly reduce attraction of Ibis and other species. Off-airport initiatives included dispersing Ibis from the Gold Coast tip and reducing the food supply in parks and wildlife sanctuaries through a public education program. Airport workers and others broke the Ibis breeding cycle by disturbing roosts with spotlights and distress callers and removing eggs and nests.” 

Fast-forward from 1995 to 2009, where statistics released by the ATSB revealed that between 1999 and 2009, of all Australia’s regional airports, Townsville Airport had the highest number of bird strikes. The ATSB reported 358 bird strikes at Townsville during that period - nearly one strike every week. CASA’s rationale of the Townsville situation was the airport’s close proximity to the Town Common conservation park, home to more than 250 bird species.

Airport chief executive Kevin Gill said a number of risk management procedures were in place to prevent bird strike. These include regularly scaring birds away from the airport with sirens and scatterguns, mowing grass at heights to discourage certain species, designing drains to deter ducks and other water birds and landscaping with plants that don’t attract birds and flying foxes. The airport also attempts to make nearby habitat as unattractive as possible for birds, even removing nests and eggs to prevent birds from returning, while runway inspections are carried out before each aircraft arrival and departure to monitor bird activity and deter them from the area.

''Safety at Townsville Airport is our first priority and of paramount importance,'' Gill said. ''Like any airport, it is vital that we have an effective bird and wildlife management strategy in plan for the safety of passengers, crew and the aircraft flying in this area.''

But despite success at both Gold Coast and Townsville airports, one industry insider believes the relationship between Australian airports and bird control could be better.

“The history of (Australian) airports and bird control is a combination of shooting everything in sight using firearms and gas guns and employing scientists who concentrate on counting birds rather than doing anything about the problem,” says Darren Stutchbury, General Manager at Bird Gard, a leading player in bird control.

“Everywhere we turn, there’s a bird problem. But airport culture in this country doesn’t seek real solutions. For instance, if there are drains the airports are advised to increase the steepness of the bank; they’re advised to mow the grass to different heights; they’re advised to collect eggs. Anything but find a real solution.”

Acoustics in the form of electronic bird repelling devices have come of age in recent years. Farmers all over Australia now use electronics to keep pest birds out of valuable grape, fruit and nut crops with great success. In a few cases, distress calls are used but for most situations artificial irritant or ‘harrassment’ sounds are used.

“Acoustics are very effective on many species, such as galahs, cockatoos, starlings, crows and many water species,” Stutchbury explains. “A few bird species are also readily dispersed by red light laser, which also serves as a means to relocate entire roosting colonies of birds that may be in the airport vicinity. We ‘zap’ them every evening for a week or two and therefore remove a source of birdstrike potential. The laser has a range of approximately 700 metres, more in complete darkness.”

Stutchbury said he recently helped a new client solve an Ibis problem that had been ongoing for 10 years. The client had been employing the same people for a decade to combat the problem but their strategy was unsuccessful. “We used one of our laser devices and it instantly repelled the birds. Problem solved. Yet in 10 years their strategy had no impact whatsover.”

But Stutchbury admitted that no-one can guarantee a totally bird-free airfield.

“Even using the best practices available – and even bits of old-fashioned ‘shoot to kill’ for particularly stubborn individual birds – you can never guarantee a totally bird-free airfield.”

BIRDSTRIKES IN AUSTRALIA 2002 TO 2006
The ATSB did a study of birdstrikes in Australia between 2002 and 2006 and discovered the following:

• Birdstrike reporting has increased from just over 700 records in 2002 to around 1,200 records in 2006. This increase in reporting does not necessarily reflect an increase in the underlying risk of birdstrikes in Australia;
• Over the period 2002 to 2006, there were 5,103 reported birdstrikes; this was one birdstrike per 6,407 air traffic movements;
• Damaging birdstrikes were rare, with 383 of 5,103 occurrences resulting in some type of damage;
• No fatal civil aviation birdstrikes accidents have occurred in Australia, but three pilots have sustained minor injuries;
• Since 2002 the total birdstrike rate per aircraft movement increased while the damaging birdstrike rate per aircraft remained fairly constant;
• Two-thirds of reported birdstrikes involved RPT operations; RPT operations were 16 times more likely to sustain a birdstrike compared with general aviation. This may reflect differences in reporting culture, or aircraft size and speed;
• Major aerodromes and regional aerodromes have a higher birdstrike rate than do GAAP aerodromes;
• Eight two-engine bird ingestions occurred but only four of these involved known damage;
• Birdstrikes vary according to location; and birdstrike rates are indicators of the effectiveness of control meaures, but cannot be taken in isolation as indicators of poor control techniques.

Source: ATSB